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SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM AND 
ITS FOES 
Michela Massimi 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I address a prominent realist challenge recently raised by Anjan 
Chakravartty (2010) against scientific perspectivism. I offer a response to the 
challenge, by rethinking scientific perspectivism as a view on how we form 
scientific knowledge, as opposed to a view about what sort of objects we have 
scientific knowledge of. My response follows Ernest Sosa’s perspectivism in 
epistemology by drawing a distinction between truth and justification for our 
knowledge claims. With this distinction in place, I pledge to defend scientific 
perspectivism as a promising alternative to both objectivist realism and 
relativism. 
 
 
Scientific perspectivism has emerged as a refreshingly new philosophical 
position in the ongoing debate between scientific realism and antirealism. 
The position has a distinguished philosophical pedigree back to Leibniz, 
Kant, Nietzsche, and even Wittgenstein.1 The motivations for 
                                                     
1
 There are several varieties of perspectivism available on the philosophical 
market. For example, Huw Price’s (2007), pp. 250-292 causal perspectivalism as 
the view that the asymmetry of causation is ultimately rooted in the deliberative 
faculties of human agents, bears similarities with the anti-representationalist 
motivation behind scientific perspectivism. My focus here is with scientific 
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perspectivism in contemporary philosophy of science are various. 
Perspectivalist themes can be found in van Fraassen, especially his latest 
book on Scientific Representation, all dedicated to the perspectival nature 
of scientific measurement, in analogy with Albrecht Dürer’s 
Unterweysung der Messung, and to the indexicality inherent our 
epistemic activities.2 Alex Rueger3 and Margie Morrison4 have both 
discussed the prospects and challenges that perspectivism faces in dealing 
with inconsistent models in science, especially in the study of fluid 
dynamics. In recent years, Ron Giere5 has championed a version of 
scientific perspectivism as a healthy via media between what he calls 
objectivist realism, on the one hand—namely, the view that science gives 
us a God’s eye knowledge of nature—and the traps of silly relativism, on 
the other hand. As is to be expected with any middle ground, the position 
faces challenges both from the realists and the relativists. In what follows, 
I will not discuss the challenge coming from relativism, and I concentrate 
instead on the challenge coming from realism. 
In a recent article,6 Anjan Chakravartty has identified perspectivism as 
a view committed to either of these two theses:  
 
(P1) We have knowledge of perspectival facts only, because non-
perspectival facts are beyond our epistemic grasp. 
                                                                                                                       
 
perspectivism itself, and I will not explore the wider philosophical context in 
which perspectivalist trends originate and flourish. 
2
 van Fraassen (2008), pp. 75-86. 
3
 Rueger (2005). 
4
 Morrison (2011). 
5
 Giere (2006a), (2006b), (2009), (2010). 
6
 Chakravartty (2010), p. 407. For a reappraisal of perspectivism from the 
point of view of taxonomic pluralism and an account of natural kinds in terms of 
sociability of properties, see Chakravartty (2011). 
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(P2) We have knowledge of perspectival facts only, because there are 
no non-perspectival facts to be known. 
 
The first is a weak claim of Kantian flavour: perspectivism would be 
compatible with the view that there are facts of the matter about the way 
nature is, but would insist that such facts of the matter are unknowable. 
The second thesis is stronger and amounts to a form of ontological 
relativism. Chakravartty discusses various arguments for perspectivism. 
One of them is the argument from detection, which from the selective 
range of input and the conditioned nature of the output concludes that 
knowledge afforded by detection procedures is always perspectival. But, 
he argues, from the fact that one’s detectors are sensitive only to specific 
aspects or properties of target systems, “it does not follow that the facts 
they describe are perspectival in any philosophically controversial sense. 
It is a non-perspectival fact about charged bodies, for example, that they 
exert electrostatic forces on other charged bodies”.7  
In this paper, I analyse the realist’s objection against the argument 
from detection. In particular, I focus on the realist view that knowledge 
afforded by scientific instruments is often knowledge of non-perspectival 
facts, and I conclude that the arguments usually provided in support of 
this claim tend to fall prey of an unwelcome form of epistemic 
bootstrapping. In this way, I hope to show that the prospects of defending 
scientific perspectivism (or—as will become apparent—some suitable 
variety of it) are not as unpromising as it might seem.  
Most of the current debate has unfolded on the assumption that 
scientific perspectivism is a philosophical position about what we have 
scientific knowledge of, i.e. what kinds of facts (perspectival or non-
perspectival) fall under the remit of our knowledge of nature. Here below, 
I am going to propose an alternative way of thinking about scientific 
                                                     
7
 Chakravartty (2010), p. 407. 
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perspectivism as a view primarily about how we gain scientific 
knowledge of nature. In so doing, I will echo Ernest Sosa’s perspectival 
coherentism, as part of his early virtue perspectivism, whose aim was to 
accomplish a similar via media between foundationalism and coherentism 
about human knowledge.8 I will draw some hopefully useful analogies 
with Sosa’s program in epistemology and his distinction between apt 
beliefs versus justified beliefs, to make the point that although the truth-
makers of our beliefs are non-perspectival facts about nature, yet the 
justification of our beliefs is intrinsically perspectival and rooted in our 
epistemic perspectives as human agents. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 gives a brief overview of 
Giere’s scientific perspectivism. Section 2 considers the dispositional 
realist’s view that perspectival knowledge reduces to knowledge of non-
perspectival facts (more precisely, knowledge of nature’s causal 
properties and dispositions). Section 3 questions the epistemic procedure 
on which such knowledge claims seem to be often made within 
dispositional realism. Section 4 sketches an alternative version of 
scientific perspectivism, which takes the lead from Sosa’s perspectival 
coherentism in distinguishing matters of truth from matters of 
justification, and relocates scientific perspectivism in the latter camp.  
 
                                                     
8
 See Sosa (1991), in particular the essays “The raft and the pyramid: 
coherence versus foundations in the theory of knowledge”; “The coherence of 
virtue and the virtue of coherence”, and “Intellectual virtue in perspective”. For a 
discussion of Sosa’s work, see Greco (ed.) (2004), especially ch. 7 by Goldman, 
and Sosa’s reply on pp. 312-313. 
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1. Ron Giere’s Scientific Perspectivism 
The secondary quality of scientific observation is Giere’s start-up 
problem for scientific perspectivism. As our human visual system 
responds only to electromagnetic waves of a certain frequency, similarly 
scientific instruments are designed to respond only to a selected range of 
inputs. Moreover, just like human vision, the output of each scientific 
observation reflects the idiosyncratic nature of both the instrument that 
produced it and its interaction with the selected input. On this 
perspectivist view, we never have an observation of, say, the Trifid 
Nebula in and of itself, but instead an observation of the Trifid “from the 
perspective provided by Malin’s three-color process”.9 We do not have 
an image of the brain, but an image “as produced by CT scanning or 
fMRI”.10 Giere uses these remarks to embark on a thoroughgoing 
perspectivist journey through scientific models and scientific theories, 
which I will not discuss in this paper. Instead I want to concentrate my 
attention on the very start-up problem for scientific perspectivism. How 
should we understand these perspectival claims about scientific 
observation and detection?  
There is something intuitively right, and even appealing, about them. 
But for these remarks to constitute the argumentative platform for a new 
philosophical position sufficiently distinct from traditional realism, they 
must be construed as claims to the effect that there is no specific way the 
observed objects are in and of themselves, independently of the particular 
perspective from which they are observed or detected. For scientific 
realists would certainly agree with Giere that observation and detection 
are always from a specific vantage point afforded by the scientific 
instrument or set-up in question. But they would also resist the 
                                                     
9
 Giere (2006a), p. 43. 
10
 Ibid. p. 56. 
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conclusion that the perspectival nature of scientific observation affects 
somehow the nature of the facts observed. 
On the other hand, as soon as the prefix “From where we stand…” is 
added, and truth claims are made relative to a perspective, the ghost of 
relativism comes back to haunt the perspectivist. One may indeed 
legitimately ask what is the difference between scientific perspectivism 
and the fact-constructivism that some philosophers see at work in Hanson 
and Kuhn? Or what is the difference between scientific perspectivism and 
Putnam’s conceptual relativism (recall Putnam’s mereological conclusion 
about the Polish mathematician),11 or Goodman’s ways of world-
making?12  
Giere replies that being relative to a perspective does not imply that 
there is no fact of the matter about the object under investigation. Think 
of Brunelleschi perspectival experiment, for example. Brunelleschi 
painted the Battisterio in Florence and then made a hole in the painting 
and by looking through the hole to the real Battisterio exactly from the 
vantage point in which he painted it, he could compare his painting with 
the image of the Battisterio in the mirror and the two were identical. The 
Battisterio would still be there, no matter from which vantage point we 
look at it. Yet there is no ‘objectivist’ way of looking at the Battisterio, 
independently of any vantage point.13  
The problem with this answer is that if all there is to scientific 
perspectivism is the view that our scientific observation and detection is 
always from a vantage point, critics are right in complaining that the 
position does not have a genuine philosophical bite. After all, scientific 
realists and anti-realists alike may well agree with the view that our 
observation and detection is always from a specific vantage point. Let us 
then analyse in more detail the challenge coming from the realist camp. 
                                                     
11
 Putnam (1990), pp. 96-103. 
12
 Goodman (1978). 
13
 For remarks along these lines, see Giere (2006a), pp. 81-82. 
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2. Dispositional Realism and the 
Argument from Detection 
Objectivist realism comes in many varieties. A prominent one in 
contemporary philosophy of science takes the form of dispositional 
realism, according to which nature is populated with genuinely occurring 
dispositions, conferred by causal properties, which may (or may not) 
manifest themselves in the presence of suitable stimuli. In a version 
originally due to Shoemaker and recently defended by Chakravartty,14 
dispositional realism captures a powerful intuition: namely, that causal 
properties are identified by the dispositions they confer on objects—
hence the name ‘dispositional identity thesis’, or DIT. If DIT is correct, 
no philosophically interesting perspectivalist claim is afforded by 
scientific observation and detection procedures for three main reasons: 
 
i. The selected range of inputs does not by itself license any 
perspectivalist conclusion about the outputs; e.g. even if a 
device may be selectively sensitive only to the electric charge of 
a body, it does not follow that the measured electrostatic force 
is itself perspectival.  
ii. The conditioned nature of the output does not by itself make it 
perspectival in any genuine sense. For example, both electron 
microscopes and light microscopes can offer different vantage 
points on a target system, and yet corroborate certain causal 
properties of it. 
iii. Perspectival facts are often explained away by the multi-faceted 
dispositional nature of the causal properties of the target system. 
For example, despite salt being ordinarily soluble in water, it 
                                                     
14
 See Shoemaker (1980), and Chakravartty (2007), pp. 123ff. 
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won’t dissolve if either the water is already saturated or is in the 
presence of a strong electromagnetic field. Yet in neither case 
would the solubility of salt be called into question.15 
 
In what follows, I suggest that although dispositional realists are correct 
in complaining that neither the selective range of inputs nor the 
conditioned nature of the outputs per se license any perspectival claim 
about the target system, there are ways of reconciling the realist 
metaphysics (dear to DIT) with a bona fide perspectivalist position.  
My argumentative strategy is the following: I envisage a problem 
standing on the way of living up to the dispositional realist’s 
metaphysical promise of unveiling the dispositional nature of the target 
system. This problem is an instantiation of a more general problem well-
known in epistemological quarters: epistemic bootstrapping. I contend 
that DIT defenders tend to leave open the question as to how our 
knowledge of the dispositional nature of the target system is justified (e.g. 
how are we justified in holding the belief that salt is indeed soluble?). 
One possible (albeit not exclusive) way of answering the justificatory 
question within the resources of DIT is to appeal to reliabilism. After all, 
reliabilism as an externalist epistemological position is congenial to DIT 
metaphysical realism: for example, one could reply that we are justified 
to believe in the solubility of the salt (even if there may be contexts in 
which this causal property is not manifested) because we have overall a 
successful past track record of observing salt dissolving in water, from 
which we generate the reliable belief that salt is soluble. But, I argue, if 
one attempts to answer the justificatory question along reliabilist lines, a 
compelling problem arises. In Section 3, I present the problem. In Section 
4, I canvas a possible way out by appealing to a new version of scientific 
perspectivism, which can retain (and is indeed compatible with) the 
                                                     
15
 The three points are raised by Chakravartty (2010), pp. 407-409, in his 
criticism of the argument from detection. 
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realist rationale behind DIT, while also doing full justice to perspectivism 
in answering the justificatory question. 
 
3. Epistemic Bootstrapping and Belief 
Justification 
Consider the question of how we gain scientific knowledge of nature. The 
dispositional realist tends to reply that measurement devices are 
successfully deployed to detect entities’ dispositions and hence causal 
properties (since causal properties are identified with the dispositions 
they confer on objects, according to DIT). This reply may take a more or 
less sophisticated form. For example, she may insist that the 
serendipitous coincidence of measurement outcomes in different 
experimental contexts is a clear indication that the causal property at 
issue is real and not an artefact of our measurement procedures. Or, she 
may insist, echoing Hacking, that insofar as we can intervene on these 
causal properties and manipulate them to do things in a lab, we are 
justified to believe that they are real.16 A common strand in these 
different replies is the following: even if our causal knowledge is 
incomplete and our causal laws do not afford us an exhaustive knowledge 
of the causal mechanisms at work in each instance, still one is justified in 
ascribing causal properties to entities in the light of their downstream 
effects on the perceptual states of the observer (when confronted with 
meter readings and other measurement devices).17 More precisely:  
                                                     
16
 Hacking (1982). 
17
 For an epistemic objection against DIT along these lines, see Rosenberg 
(1984), with a reply by Chakravartty (2007), pp. 134-36. By ‘downstream’ 
effects I mean the effects produced on the perceptual states of the observer at the 
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1. Dispositional realists seem to believe that we form reliable 
beliefs about causal properties as displayed by the dispositions 
they confer on objects via scientific instruments and detection 
procedures; 
2. They also seem to believe that what justifies our beliefs about 
causal properties is an inference-to-the-best-explanation: 
believing in those causal properties is the best explanation for 
the success of our scientific instruments and detection 
procedures in delivering reliable beliefs (i.e. beliefs that have a 
preponderant tendency to be true, incomplete causal knowledge 
notwithstanding). 
 
I want to stress the verb “seem” in 1. and 2. above, because while DIT 
has a full-blown metaphysical story about causal properties and their 
manifestations, DIT does not necessarily give us a clear indication about 
how our knowledge of these causal properties (and their manifestations) 
is in turn justified.18 Thus, despite different ways of understanding 1. 
                                                                                                                       
 
end of a potentially very long chain (which may or may not involve computer-
aided detection procedures). 
18
 One may, for example, try to endorse DIT while eschewing reliabilism (I 
thank Anjan Chakravartty for drawing my attention to this point). With or 
without reliabilism in prominent position, some form of IBE seems to be at work 
anyway in answering the justificatory question within DIT. My point in what 
follows is that such an IBE inference is often an inference from the success of 
our scientific instruments in delivering reliable beliefs about data and 
measurement outcomes (i.e. beliefs reliably generated and hence likely to be 
true) to more general beliefs about the causal ontology of nature. Hence, I take 
reliabilism to enter into the IBE inference that goes from (beliefs about) reliably 
generated experimental data (say, the displacement of fluorescence in cathode 
rays, where such displacement cannot be ascribed to experimental error and it is 
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(e.g., convergent measurement outcomes, or Hacking-style 
manipulability criterion, and so forth), our belief in, say, electrons having 
the causal property electric charge (let us call it EC) is: (1.) likely to be 
true because reliably generated via a suitable detection procedure; and 
(2.) justified because believing that electrons have electric charge is the 
best explanation for the success of our detection procedure in producing 
reliable beliefs (i.e. beliefs about electrons that have a preponderant 
tendency to be true, even if we may not know all the details of the causal 
mechanism at work in the detection procedure that delivers such beliefs). 
But if we attempt to complete DIT along these lines (in order to 
answer the justificatory question), we become vulnerable to the same 
bootstrapping objection that critics like Jonathan Vogel have levelled 
against reliablism: namely, that it sanctions its own legitimacy. The 
problem has significant consequences for this possible extended version 
of DIT. Our scientific instruments reliably pick out a causal property such 
as EC to the extent that a bootstrapping mechanism of belief justification 
has taken place.  
Let us take stock. We can see this battleground between perspectivists 
and dispositional realists clearly displayed in one historical example. 
Consider J. J. Thomson’s first series of experiments on cathode rays in 
1897.19 Thomson’s working hypothesis was that cathode rays consisted of 
negatively charged particles, which he called “corpuscles”.20 The 
                                                                                                                       
 
a genuine feature of the target system), to (beliefs about) the causal properties 
that these data provide evidence for, and are the dispositional manifestations of 
(say, electrically charged particles). 
19
 For a historical analysis of this episode, see Jed Z. Buchwald and Andrew 
Warwick (eds.) (2001), in particular ch. 1 by George Smith on “J. J. Thomson 
and the electron, 1897–1899”, and T. Arabatzis (2006), ch. 4. 
20
 As is well known, George Johnstone Stoney coined the term “electron” in 
the previous decade to refer to a fundamental unit of positive and negative 
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experimental set-up of cathode ray tube with an electrometer and a coil 
magnet, revealed that rays were bent in the presence of a magnetic field. 
Thomson was able to measure the mass-to-charge ratio of the 
“corpuscles” by inferring (in addition to the electric charge measured by 
the electrometer) the strength of the magnetic field H by the electric 
current in the coil, and by inferring the angle of deflection from the 
displaced fluorescence in the glass tube. Thus, the scientific perspectivist 
may argue that the ascription of the causal property electric charge is 
perspectival. Had either (a.) J. J. Thomson’s perceptual system been 
impaired; or (b.) had the magnetic field not been strong enough to bend 
the rays away from the collector, or had the point of fluorescence not 
been well displaced; or (c.) had the electrometer, the anod or the 
magnetic coil been faulty, J. J. Thomson would not have concluded that 
cathode rays have negative electric charge. But is electric charge itself 
perspectival in any philosophically interesting sense? 
The dispositional realist has a point when she complains that scientific 
perspectivism trades on an ambiguity. For surely the ascription of electric 
charge to cathode rays might well be perspectival; but it does not make 
the electric charge itself perspectival. Yet the dispositional realist trades 
herself on an ambiguity when in replying to the question of how we gain 
scientific knowledge of electric charge, she replies that we are justified to 
believe in this causal property because this is the best explanation for the 
success of J. J. Thomson’s detection procedure in licensing reliable 
beliefs about cathode rays and their behaviour. 
                                                                                                                       
 
electric charge. But the term had subsequently been adopted by Joseph Larmor in 
the early 1890s to refer to structural units of the ether and in the same sense 
adopted also by FitzGerald, to the point that Thomson resisted the adoption of 
the term “electron” for his “corpuscles” as late as 1906. See George Smith, op. 
cit.; and Peter Achinstein (2001). 
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 Out of the historical context, on the dispositional realist’s account, 
when confronted with the readings of an instrument like an electrometer, 
assuming that the experimenter’s perceptual system functions well and 
the electrometer is indeed accurate, the experimenter concludes:21 
 
(A) On this occasion, the electrometer reads ‘EC = -1.602 × 10-19 
C’ and EC = -1.602 × 10-19 C. 
 
Now, according to our IBE inference, we are justified to believe in 
electrically charged particles as the best explanation for the success of our 
scientific instrument (i.e. for the reliability of our electrometer in reading 
EC and delivering beliefs about electrons’ causal properties that have a 
preponderant tendency to be true). But, should this be the case, we would 
be vulnerable to a bootstrapping mechanism of belief justification that—
in the absence of an independent justification for believing that the 
electrometer is indeed accurate in reading EC, or the experimenter’s 
perceptual system not deceptive in reading the electrometer’s reading, the 
electromagnetic field strong enough to bend rays, etc.—goes from (A) to 
 
(A*)  In general, the electrometer is reliable in reading EC. 
 
(A*) is, in turn, applied to justify beliefs about similar cases that may 
warrant sufficiently similar conclusions. But for our belief that electrons 
have the causal property electric charge to be justified, and hence to 
amount to knowledge of the causal property at issue, more is required 
than a reliabilist bootstrapping process of belief-justification. 
For physicists to know the causal property electric charge as identified 
by the disposition it confers on electrons to be deflected by a magnetic 
                                                     
21
 I call ‘EC’ the causal property electric charge, while C is the unit of 
electric charge, the Coulomb. 
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field, for example, the following procedure seems to be taking place (let 
us use ‘K’ to stand for ‘Physicists know that…’ following Vogel):22  
 
(1) K (particles carry electric charge EC) RELIABLE PROCESS 
(2) K (if (causal property EC is identical to the disposition it 
confers on objects to get deflected by a magnetic field) → then 
electrically charged particles get deflected by a magnetic field) 
DIT INFERENCE 
(3) K (electrometer reads ‘EC = -1.602 × 10-19 C’ at time t1) 
PERCEPTION 
(4) K (electrically charged particles are deflected by a magnetic 
field in a cathode rays tube) PERCEPTION OF DISPLACED POINT 
OF FLUORESCENCE ON THE TUBE 
(5) K (electrically charged particles are deflected by a magnetic 
field & electrometer reads ‘EC = -1.602 × 10-19 C’) LOGICAL 
INFERENCE FROM (3) AND (4) 
(6) K (electrometer reads accurately at time t1) LOGICAL 
INFERENCE FROM (3) AND (5) (under the assumptions that the 
electrometer functions well and the experimenter’s perceptual 
system is not deceptive) 
(7) REPEAT THE OPERATION SEVERAL TIMES 
(8) K (electrometer is reliable) INDUCTION 
 
But of course, physicists cannot claim to know that the electrometer is 
reliable in this way. Instead, they would have to test the electrometer, 
check that it is properly wired, that its meter reading is not faulty, 
calibrate it, and so on. This has consequences for the envisaged version of 
DIT that attempts to answer the justificatory question via reliabilism. 
Consider what Vogel calls “rollback”: if physicists do not after all know 
that the electrometer is reliable, i.e. –(8), it follows that –(6) and –(5). 
                                                     
22
 See Vogel (2000), and (2008), p. 519, on which I draw here. 
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Since (5) follows from (3) and (4), which are not open to dispute (we are 
not assuming any evil demon hypothesis about the perceptual system of 
physicists), we should conclude –(2), namely the denial of the DIT 
inference, whence –(1). Thus, for us to know the causal property electric 
charge, more is required than the process reliabilism that seems to be at 
work in the envisaged version of DIT. This is the opening wedge of a 
perspectivist rejoinder. 
 In what follows, I want to suggest an alternative way of thinking 
about scientific perspectivism. Perspectivists need not deny that there can 
be some causal property of body x in nature ultimately making the 
experimenter’s belief about cathode rays having negative electric charge 
true. But they would also insist that what justifies such belief is ultimately 
a perspectival fact about how—to borrow Ernest Sosa’s expression—that 
belief fits into the experimenter’s epistemic perspective,23 including 
beliefs about: (1) her unimpaired perceptual state, (2) the electrometer 
reading not being faulty, (3) tests to check that the electrometer reading is 
not faulty, (4) the body’s trajectory being sufficiently deflected by the 
magnetic field, (5) the angle of deflection being deducible from the 
displacement of fluorescence in cathode rays, (6) electric current in the 
coil inducing a magnetic field, and so on.24 
                                                     
23
 Sosa introduced the notion of epistemic perspective to block the classical 
objections against coherentism in epistemology, whereby for any body of beliefs 
that seems coherent and comprehensive, there could be another system of beliefs 
equally coherent and comprehensive, which nonetheless does not confer any 
justification to its members beliefs. Sosa concludes: “to block this refutation … a 
body of beliefs need include an epistemic perspective, an account … of the ways 
in which member beliefs in various categories acquire epistemic justification … 
That amounts to a form of coherentism aptly labeled ‘perspectival’ for requiring 
an epistemic perspective in any world view adequate to induce knowledge-
making justification in member beliefs” (1991), p. 97. 
24
 One may reply that such net of beliefs, forming what I called the 
experimenter’s epistemic perspective, is entirely consistent with the 
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In Sosa’s words, “A belief is justified only if it fits coherently within 
the epistemic perspective of the believer … Animal knowledge … needs 
only belief that is apt and derives from an intellectual virtue or faculty. … 
reflective knowledge always requires belief which is not only apt but also 
has a kind of justification, since it must be belief that fits coherently 
within the epistemic perspective of the believer”.25 In Sosa’s view, the 
perspectivist can agree with the reliabilist in appealing to perception, 
memory, induction and the like when it comes to explain how we know 
nature. Yet the perspectivist would consider perception, memory, 
induction and the like reliable sources of truth or true belief, but not 
fundamental sources of justification. 
This alternative way of looking at the perspectival nature of property 
ascription cashes out a new epistemological reading of scientific 
perspectivism, which in line with Sosa’s “perspectival coherentism”, 
claims that the justification of any of our beliefs takes always place 
within an epistemic perspective, including not only first-order beliefs 
about body x, but also beliefs we have about our perceptual system, 
                                                                                                                       
 
aforementioned IBE inference, via which one may attempt to complete the DIT 
account so as to answer the justificatory question (I thank Anjan Chakravartty for 
raising this point). In reply, I think that a DIT defender, who is happy to embrace 
such perspectivist twist has already gone a long way from the received view 
towards the kind of perspectivism that I want to defend here, namely one that is 
ultimately compatible with realism, while also doing full justice to perspectival 
considerations in belief-justification. We are justified to believe in electrons 
having electric charge not because our detection procedures are ultimately 
reliable (although, this may explain why our beliefs about electrons are true); but 
instead we are justified in holding such belief about electrons because—in 
addition to being reliably generated—it fits into an epistemic perspective 
including various other first- and second-order beliefs we have about ourselves 
and nature.  
25
 Ibid., p. 145. 
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cognitive faculties, measurement devices, and their reliability as sources 
of beliefs.26 
Here below I can only sketch such an epistemological version of 
scientific perspectivism. The start-up problem is not whether or not 
electrons have electric charge, but under what conditions we are justified 
to believe that electrons have electric charge; in other words, under what 
conditions we can claim to know that electrons have electric charge. The 
notion of epistemic perspective helps cash out precisely the conditions 
under which such knowledge-claims can be made and arguably defended.  
 
4. An Epistemic Version of Scientific 
Perspectivism 
Consider again J. J. Thomson’s experimental work on the electrons. Can 
we say that J. J. Thomson knew the electron? Philosophers and historians 
have asked the question of whether he discovered the electron,27 given 
                                                     
26
 See ibid. p. 210: “that thought experiment yielded the need for coherentism 
to require not only the coherence and comprehensiveness of a world view but 
also that the subject who holds that view places himself within it at the time in 
question with awareness both of his own beliefs at the time and of his possible 
means of intellectual access to himself and the world around him at that time and 
in the past. … A good label for coherentism modified to include these 
requirements is perspectival coherentism, for it is coherentism requiring of an 
epistemically effectual world view that it makes essential provision for a 
subjective and epistemic perspective by including both a view of the object-level 
beliefs held by the subject and a view of the sorts of reliable beliefs—about 
himself, his world, and his past—open to him”. 
27
 For the historiographical debate on this point, see Falconer (1987), and 
Achinstein (2001). 
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that he refused to use the term “electron” even in his Nobel Prize speech, 
and a series of people can be legitimately regarded as contributing to the 
discovery of the electron at different stages (from Stoney to Crook, from 
Larmor to Lorentz). But asking whether Thomson really discovered the 
electron presupposes the DIT assumption that causal properties are up for 
grabs to be ‘read off’ via the deployment of suitable detection procedures.  
I want to ask instead a different type of question: namely, whether J. J. 
Thomson knew the electron, namely given the epistemic environment he 
worked in, what epistemic conditions allowed him to gain knowledge of 
nature’s fundamental properties. I take this to be the central question that 
an epistemic version of scientific perspectivism should be concerned with 
and address. This way of thinking about scientific perspectivism as an 
epistemic position (rather than a metaphysical view about whether or not 
there are genuine perspectival facts) helps us revisit important issues, 
from scientific progress to incommensurability. One can indeed ask 
whether the epistemic conditions under which we have knowledge of the 
electron today are the same conditions under which J. J. Thomson 
operated, and hence to what extent there has been progress in our 
scientific knowledge of electrons since Thomson’s time, and whether we 
can legitimately claim to be referring to the same entity despite epistemic 
changes.  
 Consider for example, J. J. Thomson’s belief (Y.), i.e. the belief that 
cathode rays consisted of negatively charged particles and that those 
particles (whose m/e ratio he measured with accuracy) were not electrons 
but instead what he called ‘corpuscles’. One can ask to what extent 
entertaining belief (Y.) amounts to knowing the electron and its 
fundamental properties (such as charge). I take that answering this 
question requires answering the following two sub-questions (following 
Sosa):28 
                                                     
28
 Sosa distinguishes between apt belief and justified belief as follows (see 
Sosa 1991, p. 289): “the ‘justification’ of a belief B requires that B has a basis in 
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1. Is belief (Y.) apt? i.e. relative to environment E, is the belief 
derived from what Sosa would call an ‘intellectual virtue’ (V 
(C, F)), which yields a preponderance of truth over error? (for 
propositions P in field F, given contextual conditions C). In this 
case, belief (Y.) would be apt because generated from J. J. 
Thomson’s intellectual virtue, as an experimentalist, to identify 
true propositions about cathode rays, given his theoretical and 
experimental environment E (say, Victorian Cambridge 
physics), and specific contextual conditions C (i.e., his 
apparatus and methodology). 
2. Is belief (Y.) justified? i.e. is the belief safely grounded in a 
coherent body of beliefs in, say, J. J. Thomson’s epistemic 
perspective? 
                                                                                                                       
 
its inference or coherence relations to other beliefs in the believer’s mind—as in 
the justification of a belief derived from deeper principles and thus ‘justified’ …; 
the ‘aptness’ of a belief B relative to an environment E requires that B derives 
from what relative to E is an intellectual virtue, i.e. a way of arriving at belief 
that yields an appropriate preponderance of truth over error (in the field of 
propositions in question, in the sort of context defined by C)”. In particular, Sosa 
defines how a subject is internally apt in believing something as follows: “(IA’) 
S believes proposition P out of sufficient virtue relative to epistemic group G iff 
(a) S believes P out of intellectual virtue V (C, F) and (b) the likelihood that S 
believes correctly when S believes out of intellectual virtue V (C, F) is at least up 
near the average for group G.” Animal knowledge consists primarily of apt, yet 
rarely justified beliefs. Reflective knowledge, on the other hand, requires beliefs, 
which are not only apt but also justified: our best reflective knowledge consists 
of apt and justified beliefs, where aptness has to do with intellectual virtue as a 
way of expressing how reliable the source of the belief is in producing a 
preponderance of truth over error; whereas justification is ultimately a matter of 
perspectival coherence. 
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The two sub-questions are distinct: a positive answer to the first question 
secures that the belief (Y.) is likely to be true. A positive answer to the 
second question guarantees that in addition to being likely to be true, the 
belief is also justified. Justification presupposes aptness, but not vice 
versa. A belief can be apt without being thus justified; but justified beliefs 
cannot in general be inapt.29 Apt beliefs are reliably generated, whereas 
justified beliefs are apt beliefs, which in addition are born of perspectival 
coherence. 
 A case can easily be made for belief (Y.) being apt: the belief was 
reliably generated from experimental processes and techniques (e.g. J. J. 
Thomson 1897 cathode rays experiments as well as Lenard’s evidence for 
the small mass of the particles at work in cathode rays absorption). Given 
the experimental and theoretical environment E in which Thomson 
worked (i.e., cathode rays experimental tradition back to Crooks and 
Faraday), and given specific contextual conditions C (for example, 
Thomson’s two distinct methods for measuring m/e),30 the belief that 
cathode rays consisted of negatively charged material particles was very 
likely to be true, and likely to be embraced as such by the scientific 
community, as the timely Nobel Prize in 1906 testifies to. But was (Y.) 
also justified?  
                                                     
29
 Sosa allows for the conceivability of inapt justified beliefs (ibid., p. 292), 
while also stressing that “there is no aptness without coherence, or at least our 
potential for coherence”. 
30
 The first method relied on measuring the charge Q at the collector via an 
electrometer, the kinetic energy W inferred from the increase of temperature at 
the collector (via a thermocouple), the magnetic field H inferred from the current 
in the coil, and the radius of curvature (ρ) inferred from the displaced 
fluorescence. The second method calculated m/e only from macroscopic 
observables such as the angle of deflection (θ) in the presence of superimposed 
electric F and magnetic fields H. See Smith, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
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Among the coherent body of beliefs available to Thomson at the time, 
and forming part of his ‘epistemic perspective’, as it were, the following 
ones seemed to have played a prominent role in shaping his belief (Y.) 
about cathode rays: 
 
(a.) Cathode rays are associated with negative charge; 
(b.) Cathode rays are identical to negatively charged particles; 
(c.) Negatively charged particles are material; 
(d.) Electrons are immaterial structural features of a fluid elastic 
ether (with a vacuous core); 
(Y.)  Therefore, cathode rays consist of negatively charged particles, 
which are not electrons (call them instead ‘corpuscles’). 
 
Thus, for (Y.) to be justified from a perspectival viewpoint, we should 
ask whether (Y.) fitted coherently with the rest of these beliefs, and 
reflect as to whether the sources of these first-order beliefs about cathode 
rays were themselves reliable (forming as it were second-order beliefs 
about the origin of first-order beliefs). As it appears, the subset of beliefs 
(a.)–(d.) from which (Y.) is inferred within J. J. Thomson’s epistemic 
perspective, does form a coherent, self-standing sub-set: it is coherent to 
think that the negatively charged particles at work in cathode rays are not 
electrons, if electrons were by default identified with structural features 
of an all-pervasive immaterial ether. But how about the sources of beliefs 
(a.)–(d.)? were these beliefs in turn reliably generated?  
Thomson’s first experiments in May 1897 revealed that cathode rays 
were associated with negative charge (as per belief a.). A subsequent set 
of experiments, whose results were announced in October 1897, 
demonstrated that cathode rays were ‘invariably accompanied’ by 
negatively charged particles, supporting then belief (b).31 In both cases, 
Thomson was able to measure with accuracy the mass-to-charge ratio of 
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the particles and found to his dismay that it was much smaller than the 
mass-to-charge ratio measured in electrolysis. He resorted to the 
experiments of Lenard on the absorption of cathode rays32 to support the 
conclusion that the negatively charged particles were material corpuscles 
(as per (c.)) with a very small mass (compared to ordinary atoms and 
molecules such as those at work in electrolysis) and high velocity. The 
term “electron” had been introduced in 1891 by George Stoney to 
indicate the smallest unit of electric charge at work in electrolysis and 
within the context of the ether theory. Stoney’s use of the term was 
further expanded by Joseph Larmor in 1894. Working within the vortex 
theory of the atom (dating back to the work of Lord Kelvin and James 
Clerk Maxwell in the 1860s),33 Larmor regarded the electrons as 
structural features of the elastic ether, with an empty core, radial vibration 
(with a certain phase and amplitude), and electric charge. Thus, J. J. 
Thomson (despite some speculative work he himself did on the vortex 
theory of the atom, whence belief (d.)) could not accept the conclusion 
that the negatively charged particles cathode rays consisted of, were one 
                                                                                                                       
 
31
 See for details George Smith, op. cit. 
32
 From 1892 to 1896, a year before Thomson’s experiments, Lenard run a 
series of experiments on cathode rays outside the tube, which became known as 
“Lenard rays”. He studied the absorption properties of those rays in gases and 
thick metal foil, and concluded that the rays must consist of particles much 
smaller than ordinary molecules or atoms, which would normally be blocked by 
the thick metals. Some historians have suggested that these experiments must 
have inspired Thomson a year later in his conclusion about the very small mass 
of the corpuscles at work in cathode rays (see on this point Helge Kragh (2001), 
p. 220, ft 25; and also Peter Achinstein, op. cit., p. 404. 
33
 On the vortex theory of the atom and its role for J. J. Thomson’s work on 
the electron, see Jaume Navarro (2005) and Helge Kragh (2002). 
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and the same with the immaterial structural features of the ether, i.e. the 
electrons. Hence, his belief (Y.).34  
Going back to perspectivism, was J. J. Thomson justified to believe 
(Y.)? There is a sense in which he was justified to believe (Y.), insofar as 
(Y.) was part of a coherent system of beliefs he (and the majority of 
people at his time) accepted. But there is another sense in which, if 
deeply reflecting on the sources of each of the beliefs involved in 
Thomson’s epistemic perspective, he was not justified in believing (Y.) 
because some of the beliefs involved in the logical inference for (Y.) 
were not born of reliable sources (for example, belief (d.) was born of a 
respectable, yet rather speculative theoretical tradition such as the vortex 
theory of the atom, entangled as it was with esoteric Victorian Cambridge 
practices of spiritualism, for example).35 This explains why J. J. Thomson 
was justified to believe (Y.) from his own epistemic perspective as much 
as we are justified in not believing (Y.) from our own perspective (from 
which belief (d.) has been expunged),36 although we share with Thomson 
                                                     
34
 Navarro has told a more nuanced story of Thomson’s relation to the ether 
theory, whereby Thomson refused the term ‘electron’, because in the vortex 
theory of the atom, electrons were structural features of the ether, but he was 
himself happy to accept the ether theory and subscribed to the view that electrons 
were somehow supervenient features of the elastic ether. For details, see Navarro 
(2005). This more nuanced historical reading of Thomson’s reaction to the ether 
theory is still in line with my suggestion that although beliefs about the ether 
may enter in the justification of Thomson’s belief (Y.), such theory (and beliefs 
about the ether) were not likely to be true, and, hence, per se would not be 
sufficient to justify Thomson’s belief (Y.). 
35
 For an intriguing account of the broader intellectual context in which the 
vortex theory of the atom flourished and became popular in Victorian 
Cambridge, see Kragh (2002). 
36
 Perspectival/contextual considerations resonate in Chakravartty (2010), p. 
411, in relation to how different experimental contexts may select different 
dispositions of scientific entities. What I suggest here is sympathetic with this 
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and his contemporaries the true belief that cathode rays consist of 
negatively charged material particles, whose mass-to-charge ratio was 
accurately measured by Thomson’s experiments.37 
Justified-belief-attribution is always perspectival and contextual: it 
has to do with the way each belief fits into the agent’s epistemic 
perspective. But the perspectival nature of justified-belief-attribution does 
not open the door to epistemic relativism of Rortian type or to Kuhnian 
incommensurability. What makes belief (Y.) non-accidentally true is not 
only the reliable experimental methods followed by Thomson in 
grounding beliefs (a.)–(c.), but also the way (Y.), in a suitably revised 
form, ended up interlocking a coherent system of beliefs, from which the 
inapt belief (d.) was eventually expunged. It took another generation of 
scientists of Einstein’s calibre, and a deep conceptual revision of some 
central issues in electrodynamics to get rid of (d.), or at least to make 
evident its inapt character.  
Thus, the epistemic version of scientific perspectivism here sketched 
shares with reliabilism the view that whether something is a reliable 
source of truth or true belief is not context-dependent or perspective-
dependent. There are facts of the matter that make our beliefs about 
nature either true or false, and these facts of the matter are not 
                                                                                                                       
 
line, and goes further in claiming that what we are justified to believe about 
scientific entities and their causal properties depends ultimately on our epistemic 
perspective. 
37
 This shows once more the delicate relation between aptness and 
justification of beliefs, to borrow Sosa’s expression. For (Y.) to be apt, it has to 
be generated via reliable methods, and Thomson’s accurate experimental 
methods for measuring the m/e of cathode rays particles count as such. But for 
this same belief to be justified, it must be non-accidentally true because of the 
reliable way in which it has been generated, and also because it fits coherently 
into an interlocking system of beliefs (forming the epistemic perspective). 
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perspectival or context-dependent. Reliable methods and procedures 
ultimately tell us whether or not the electrons really have the mass-to-
charge ratio that Thomson found, and whether or not electrons are 
structural features of an elastic ether. Yet the process through which we 
come to know these facts of the matter has an important perspectival 
component: our beliefs about mass-to-charge ratio or about electrons 
being structural features of the elastic ether may or may not be justified, 
depending on whether they fit coherently within a system of apt beliefs. 
By occupying an epistemic perspective, the agent is able to self-reflect on 
her beliefs, on the sources of her beliefs, the way beliefs cohere with one 
another, no less than the way in which they, individually and jointly, are 
anchored to the empirical ground via reliable methods. Although there 
may be several ways of world-knowing (as there are many perspectives 
conferring justification to member beliefs), there is only one natural 
world they all ultimately respond to. Yet nature legislates on our ways of 
knowing within the bounds of our historically contingent and interest-
relative epistemic perspectives. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Looking back at Giere’s scientific perspectivism and some of the 
criticisms coming from realist quarters, in this paper I have tried to show 
two main things. First, I have attempted to deflate the realist challenge by 
showing how knowledge of the dispositional nature of target systems 
needs a more complex story to be told about how we come to know 
nature’s dispositions. The DIT account at best leaves this question open. 
If we attempt to answer the justificatory question within the resources of 
DIT via inference to the best explanation from the success of our 
experimental practices in delivering reliable beliefs, the position may 
become vulnerable to a form of epistemic bootstrapping.  
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Second, and related to the first point, I have suggested that 
perspectival knowledge needs not and does not reduce to knowledge of 
non-perspectival, dispositional facts about the target system, if we 
interpret ‘reduce’ in the philosophically interesting, epistemic sense, i.e. 
in the sense of how we come to know those facts. That there are genuinely 
occurring properties in nature that our scientific theories latch on is a fact. 
That they are the truth-makers of our beliefs is also a fact. But so is also 
the complex perspectival process through which such properties become 
the objects of our scientific knowledge.  
Needless to say, what I have offered here is only a sketch of how a 
possible epistemic version of scientific perspectivism may look like. A lot 
more work needs be done to clarify the details of the position, and how 
the issue of truth and justification are inter-related within the approach I 
am suggesting. Important resources and tools are available for this work 
within the epistemological tradition of Ernest Sosa, to which I have 
latched on, and I leave the exploration of these resources for my future 
research. But what I hope to have shown in this paper is that the prospects 
of scientific perspectivism are not as unpromising as they might seem. 
Perspectivism does not have to threaten realist metaphysics, anymore 
than uncovering such metaphysics would necessarily undercut the 
legitimacy of epistemic perspectivism. 
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